We propose a general theoretical method for analyzing the risk bound in the presence of adversaries. In particular, we try to fit the adversarial learning problem into the minimax framework. We first show that the original adversarial learning problem could be reduced to a minimax statistical learning problem by introducing a transport map between distributions. Then we prove a risk bound for this minimax problem in terms of covering numbers. In contrast to previous minimax bounds in [22, 15] , our bound is informative when the radius of the ambiguity set is small. Our method could be applied to multi-class classification problems and commonly-used loss functions such as hinge loss and ramp loss. As two illustrative examples, we derive the adversarial risk bounds for kernel-SVM and deep neural networks. Our results indicate that a stronger adversary might have a negative impact on the complexity of the hypothesis class and the existence of margin could serve as a defense mechanism to counter adversarial attacks.
Introduction
Machine learning models, especially deep neural networks, have achieved impressive performance in a variety of domains including image classification, natural language processing and speech recognition. However, it has been observed that these techniques could be easily fooled by adversarial examples, i.e., carefully-perturbed input samples aimed to cause misclassification at test phase. This phenomenon was first studied in the problem of spam filtering [13, 24, 25] and has brought considerable attention since 2014, when Szegedy et al. [31] noticed that small perturbations to images could cause neural network classifiers to predict the wrong class. Since then, a large amount of work has been devoted to develop adversarial attacks against machine learning algorithms [18, 7, 6] , and at the same time many defense mechanisms are also proposed to counter these attacks [19, 17, 14] . These works focus on creating optimization-based robust algorithms. However the generalization performance under adversarial input perturbations is still not fully understood.
More recently, the generalization problem in the adversarial setting has been discussed by Schmidt et al. in [29] , where the authors show that the sample complexity of learning a specific distribution in the presence of l ∞ -bounded adversaries increases by an order of √ d for all classifiers. And deriving the agnostic-distribution generalization bound is raised as an open problem in [29] . In a subsequent work [12] , Cullina et al. extend the standard PAC-learning framework to the adversarial setting by defining a corrupted hypothesis class, and show that the VC-dimension of this corrupted hypothesis classes for halfspace classifiers does not increase in the presence of an adversary. While their work provides a theoretical understanding of the problem of learning with adversaries, there are two limitations. First, their results could only be applied to binary problem whereas in reality we usually need to deal with multiclass problems. Second, the 0-1 loss function used in their work is not convex and thus very hard to optimize.
In this paper, we propose a general theoretical method for analyzing the generalization performance in the presence of adversaries. In particular, we try to fit the adversarial learning problem into the minimax framework [22] . Different from the traditional statistical learning where the underlying data distribution P is unknown but fixed, the minimax framework considers the uncertainty about the distribution P by introducing an ambiguity set and then aims to minimize the risk with respect to the worst-case distribution in this set. Motivated by [22] , we first note that the adversarial expected risk over a distribution P is equivalent to the standard expected risk under a new distribution P ′ . Since this new distribution is not fixed and depends on the hypothesis, we instead consider the worst case. In this way, the original adversarial learning problem could be reduced to a minimax problem. And we can use the minimax approach to derive the risk bound for the adversarial expected risk. We summarize our contributions as follows.
• We propose a general method for analyzing the risk bound in the presence of adversaries. Our method is general in several aspects. First, the adversary we consider is general and encompasses all l p bounded adversaries for p ≥ 1. Second, our method could be applied to multi-class problems and other commonly-used loss functions such as hinge loss and ramp loss whereas [12] only considers binary classification problem and 0-1 loss.
• We prove that the 1/ǫ term in the bound given in [22, 15] where ǫ represents the radius of the adversary could be eliminated under a mild Lipschitz assumption. This is the case for most commonly-used loss functions. Therefore, our bound is informative when ǫ is small.
• We derive the adversarial risk bounds for SVM, kernel-SVM and deep neural networks. Our results suggest that the complexity of the hypothesis class might be reduced in the presence of a stronger adversary and margin plays an essential role in defending adversarial attacks.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss some related works. Section 3 will give the formal definition of the problem. Our theoretical method will be presented in Section 4, and the adversarial risk bound for SVM and Neural Networks will be described in Section 5. In Section 6, we conclude our paper and make some future remarks.
Related Works
Our work leverages some research directions in statistical machine learning, summarized as follows.
Generalization in Supervised Learning
Generalization is a central problem in supervised learning and there are extensive works on characterizing the generalization capability of a learning algorithm. Thus, the review here is non-exhaustive.
Generally, there are mainly two approaches to analyze the generalization bound of a learning algorithm. The first one is based on the complexity of the hypothesis class, such as VC dimension [33, 34] for binary classification, Rademacher and Gaussian complexities [5, 3] , and the covering number [41, 40, 4] . Note that the hypothesis complexity based analyses of generalization error are algorithmic independent and consider the worst case generalization over all functions in the hypothesis class. In contrast, the second approach is based on some properties of a learning algorithm and thus must be algorithmic dependent. The properties that characterize the generalization of a learning algorithm include, for example, algorithmic stability [9, 30, 23] , robustness [37] , and algorithmic luckiness [20] . There are some other methods to analyze the generalization error in machine learning, such as PAC-Bayesian approach [27, 2] , sample compression bounds [21] , information-theoretic approaches [36, 1, 28, 38] , and optimal transport approach [39].
Minimax Statistical Learning
As opposed to standard empirical risk minimization in supervised learning where test data follow the same distribution as training data, minimax statistical learning arises in the problems of distributionally robust learning [16, 22] , which minimizes the worse case risk over a family of probability distributions. Thus it can be applied to the learning setting where the distribution of test data differs from that of training data, such as domain adaptation and transfer learning [10] . In particular, [16] propose a dual representation of worst-case risk over the ambiguity set of probability distributions which is given by balls in Wasserstein space. Then, [22] derive the risk bound for minimax learning, by exploiting the dual representation of worse case risk proposed by [16] . However, the minimax risk bound proposed by [22] is too loose when the radius ǫ is small because of a 1/ǫ term. In this work, we will show that this 1/ǫ term could be eliminated under a mild Lipschitz assumption.
Learning with Adversaries
The existence of adversaries during the test phase of a learning algorithm makes our learning systems untrustworthy. Extensive works have contributed to the attackdefense arm race in the field of adversarial machine learning, while literatures on the theoretic analysis of adversarial learning are quite limited. See [8] for a comprehensive literature review of works on adversarial machine learning. Recent work of [12] analyzes the VC dimension in the binary classification setting with evasion adversaries. However, there are some limitation with respect to their analysis, where they only consider the case of 0-1 loss with evasion adversaries in binary classification. In this work, we propose a general method that could be applied to multi-class problems and other commonly-used loss functions.
Problem Setup
We consider a standard statistical learning framework. Let Z = X × Y be a measurable instance space where X and Y represent feature and label spaces respectively. We assume that examples are independently and identically distributed according to some fixed but unknown distribution P . The learning problem is then formulated as follows. The learner considers a class H of hypothesis h : X → Y and a loss function l : Y × Y → R + . The learner receives n training examples denoted by S = ((x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), · · · , (x n , y n )) drawn i.i.d. from P and tries to select a hypothesis h ∈ H that has a small expected risk. However, in the presence of adversaries, there will be imperceptible perturbations to the input of the examples, which are called adversarial examples. And we assume that the adversarial examples are generated by adversarially choosing an example from the neighborhood N (x). We require that N (x) to be nonempty and some choice of examples is always available. Throughout the paper, we assume that N (x) = {x ′ : x ′ − x ∈ B} where B is a nonempty, closed, convex, origin-symmetric set. Note that the definition of B is very general and encompasses all l p bounded adversaries when p ≥ 1. Now, we give the formal definition of adversarial expected risk and empirical risk to measure the learner's performance in the presence of adversaries. 
If B is the zero-dimensional space {0}, then the adversarial expected risk will reduce to the standard expected risk without an adversary.
Since in practice the true distribution is usually unknown, we instead use the empirical distribution to approximate the true distribution, which is equal to (x i , y i ) with probability 1/n for each i ∈ {1, · · · , n}. That gives us the following definition of adversarial empirical risk. 
where P n represents the empirical distribution.
In the next section, we are going to derive adversarial risk bounds.
Main Results
We introduce our main results in this section. The trick is to pushforward the original distribution P to a new distribution P ′ by a transport map T h : Z → Z which satisfies
is the standard expected risk without the adversary. So an upper bound on the expected risk over the new distribution leads to an upper bound on the adversarial expected risk. Note that the new distribution P ′ is not fixed and depends on the hypothesis h. As a result, the traditional statistical learning could not be directly applied. However we notice that these new distributions lie within a Wasserstein-ball centered on P . If we consider the worst-case within this Wasserstein-ball , then the original adversarial learning problem could be reduced to a minimax problem. And we can use minimax approach to derive the adversarial risk bound. Now we first introduce the Wasserstein distance and minimax framework.
Wasserstein distance and local worst-case risk
with d X and d Y representing the metric in the feature space and label space respec-
With this metric, we denote by P(Z) the space of all Borel probability measures on Z, and by P p (Z) the space of all P ∈ P(Z) with finite pth moments for p ≥ 1
Then the pth Wasserstein distance between two probability measures P, Q ∈ P p (Z) is defined as
where Γ(P, Q) denotes the collection of all measures on Z × Z with marginals P and Q on the first and second factors respectively. Now we define the local worst-case risk of h at P ,
With these definitions, next we are going to show how the adversarial expected risk can be related to the local worst-case risk by a transport map T h .
Transport map
Define a mapping T h :
. By the definition of d Z , it is easy to get d Z ((x, y), (x * , y)) = d X (x, x * ). Now we prove that the adversarial expected risk can be related to the standard expected risk via the mapping T h . Lemma 1. Let P ′ = T h #P , the pushforward of P by T h , then we have
Proof. By the definition, we have
By this lemma, the adversarial expected risk over a distribution P is equivalent to the standard expected risk over a new distribution P ′ . However since the new distribution is not fixed and depends on the hypothesis h, the traditional statistical learning could not be directly applied. Luckily, we could prove that all these new distributions locate within a Wasserstein-ball centered at P in the following lemma. Lemma 2. Define the radius of the adversary B as ǫ B := sup x∈B d X (x, 0). For any hypothesis h and the corresponding P ′ = T h #P , we have
Proof. By the definition of Wasserstein distance,
where the last inequality uses the translation invariant property of d X . Therefore,
From this lemma, we can see that all possible new distributions lie within a Wasserstein-ball of radius ǫ B centered on P . So by upper bounding the worst-case risk in the ball, we can bound the adversarial expected risk. The relationship between local worst-case risk and adversarial expected risk is written as follows. Notice that this inequality holds for any p ≥ 1. So in the rest of the paper, we only discuss the case p = 1, that is
Adversarial risk bounds
In this subsection, we first prove a bound for the local worst-case risk. Then the adversarial risk bounds could be derived directly by (1) . For the convenience of our discussion, we denote a function class F by compositing the functions in H with the loss function l(·, ·), i.e., F = {(x, y) → l(h(x), y) : h ∈ H}. The key ingredient to a bound on the local worst-case risk is the following strong duality result due to Gao and Kleywegt [16] :
For any upper semicontinuous function f : Z → R and for any P ∈ P p (Z),
We begin with some assumptions.
Assumption 2. The functions in F are upper semicontinuous and uniformly bounded:
In order to prove the local worst-case risk bound, we need two technical lemmas. 
where λ f = sup{λ :
For the second case, the proof consists of two steps. The first step is to showλ ≤ L. If λ > L, by the Lipschitz assumption, we have
Since f take values in [0, M ], g(λ) also belongs to [0, M ] for any λ. Then we show that g is continuous and monotonically non-increasing. The monotonicity is easy to verify from the definition. For the continuousness, for any λ 2 > λ 1 , suppose that
Then we have
. We choose λ f to be the maximal one in that set. In the following part, we only need to showλ ≥ λ f . In fact, for any λ < λ f , since g is monotonically non-increasing, we have
By rearranging the items on both sides, we obtain
Therefore,λ ≥ λ f , and we complete the proof.
Then the expected Rademacher complexity of the function class Φ satisfies
The proof of this lemma is contained in Appendix A.
With the above two lemmas, now we can give the generalization bound for local worst-case risk.
. If the assumptions 1-3 holds, then for any f ∈ F, we have
with probability at least 1 − δ.
Proof. For any f ∈ F, definē
Then using Proposition 1, we can write
and thus define the function class
Since all f ∈ F takes values in [0, M ], the same holds for all ϕ ∈ Φ. Therefore, by a standard symmetrization argument [26] ,
is the expected Rademacher complexity of Φ. Using the bound of lemma 4, we get the following result
This leads to the following upper bound on the adversarial expected risk.
Corollary 1. With the conditions in theorem 1, we have
and
The proof of (4) relies on the following proposition [22] .
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in the Appendix B. Remark 3. As seen in the Corollary 1, the adversarial expected risk could be bounded as the sum of the regular empirical risk without an adversary and some other terms. We are interested in how the adversarial risk bounds differ from the case when the adversary is absent. Plugging ǫ B = 0 into inequality (4) yields to the usual generalization of the form
So the effect of an adversary is to introduce an extra complexity term 12 √ π √ n Λ ǫ B · diam(Z) and an additional contribution to the empirical risk that depends on ǫ B linearly.
Remark 4. It is worth mentioning that if ǫ B ≥ M L the extra complexity term will decrease as ǫ B gets bigger, indicating that a stronger adversary might have a negative impact on the complexity of the hypothesis class. This is consistent with our intuition since different hypotheses might have the same performance in the presence of a strong adversary and therefore the complexity of the hypothesis class will decrease.
Example Bounds
In this section, we illustrate the application of Corollary 1 to two commonly-used models: SVMs and Neural networks.
Support vector machines
We first start with SVMs. Let Z = X × Y, where the feature space X = {x ∈ R d : ||x|| 2 ≤ r} and the label space Y = {−1, +1}. Equip Z with the Euclidean metric
Consider the hypothesis space F = max{0, 1 − yh(x)}, where h ∈ H = {x → w · x : ||w|| 2 ≤ Λ}. Now we can derive the expected risk bound for SVMs in the presence of an adversary.
Corollary 2.
For the SVM setting we consider above, with probability at least 1 − δ,
The proof of Corollary 2 is contained in Appendix C. Our result could be easily extended to kernel SVM. Here, we take Gaussian kernel as an example. Let K : X × X → R be a Gaussian kernel with K(x 1 , x 2 ) = exp(−||x 1 − x 2 || 2 2 /σ 2 ). Let τ : X → H be a feature mapping associated to K and H = {x → w, τ (x) : ||w|| H ≤ Λ} where ·, · is the inner product in the Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space H and || · || H is the induced norm. Suppose X ⊆ R d is compact and the space Z is equipped with the metric
It is easy to show that d X = ||τ (x) − τ (x ′ )|| H is translation invariant from the definition of Gaussian kernel. To apply Corollary 1, we need to calculate the covering numbers N (F, ||·|| ∞ , ·). To this end, we embed H into the space C(X ) of continuous real-valued function on X denoted by I K (H) equipped with the sup norm ||h|| X := sup x∈X |h(x)| and use the following Proposition [11] .
holds for all 0 < u ≤ Λ/2. Now we can derive the adversarial risk bound for the Gaussian-kernel SVM.
Corollary 3. For the Gaussian-kernel SVM we describe above, with probability at least 1 − δ,
The proof of Corollary 3 is contained in Appendix C. Remark 5. We can also derive a margin bound for SVM in the multi-class classification setting, see Corollary 4.
Neural Networks
We proceed to consider feed-forward neural networks. To demonstrate the generality of our method, we consider a multi-class prediction problem. Let's first define some notations. Let Z = X × Y, where the feature space X = {x ∈ R d : ||x|| 2 ≤ B} and the label space Y = {1, 2, · · · , k} with k representing the number of classes. The network uses L fixed nonlinear activation functions (σ 1 , σ 2 , · · · , σ L ) where σ i is ρ ilipschitz and satisfies σ i (0) = 0. Given L weight matrices A = (A 1 , A 2 , · · · , A L ), the network computes the following function .
Consider the hypothesis class
where || · || σ represents spectral norm and || · || F denotes the Frobenius norm. The metric in the space Z is defined as
Now we derive the adversarial expected risk for neural networks.
Corollary 4. For neural network setting we define above, with probability of 1 − δ, the following inequality holds
.
The proof of this Corollary is provided in Appendix D. Remark 6. Setting ǫ B = 0, we can obtain a risk bound for neural networks in terms of the spectral norm and the Frobenius norm of the weight matrices, see (5) . Although the result (5) is similar to the results in [4, 27] , the proof technique is different. We hope that our approach could provide a different perspective on the generalization analysis in deep neural networks.
Remark 7. As we have mentioned in Remark 3, the adversary will introduce an additional contribution to the empirical risk. However from the Corollary 4, we can see that this effect could be weakened by the margin factor. This makes sense since margin can be regarded as a mechanism to defend adversarial attacks. But we may wonder that how large the margin should be to defend a certain adversary or how strong an adversary should be to attack a certain margin. We raise it as an open problem in Section 6.
Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a theoretical method for deriving the adversarial risk bounds. While our method is general and can be easily applied to multi-class problems and most commonly-used loss functions, the bound might be loose in some cases. The main reason is that we always consider the worst case such that we can avoid the problem of solving the transport map. But for some simple problems, deriving the transport map directly might give us a better bound. The other reason is that we use covering numbers instead of the expected Rademacher complexity as our upper bounds. This will make our results a little weaker. As we can see, there is an unavoidable dimension dependency in our result. We conjecture that this dependency might be avoided by replacing the covering numbers in our bounds with the Rademacher complexity of the hypothesis class and leave it to our future work. We mention two future problems for research. One interesting problem is to understand how the adversary affects the complexity of the hypothesis class. We have already discuss the case when ǫ B ≥ M/L, see Remark 4. But for ǫ B < M/L it still remains unclear. The second problem is to figure out the quantitative relationship between margin and adversary. For example, given a certain margin, we hope to know how strong an adversary should be to ensure that it could successfully attack the model.
A Proof of Lemma 4
Proof of Lemma 4. Define the Φ-indexed process X = (X ϕ ) ϕ∈Φ by
Note that E[X ϕ ] = 0 for all ϕ ∈ Φ. First we show that X is a subgaussian process with respect to the pseudometric d Φ (ϕ, ϕ ′ ), defined as
From the definition of ϕ λ,f , it is easy to show that ||ϕ − ϕ ′ || ∞ ≤ d Φ (ϕ, ϕ ′ ). Then for any t ∈ R, we can get
where the second equality is by the fact that (σ i , z i ) are i.i.d., and the final inequality uses Hoeffding's lemma. Therefore, X is subgaussian with respect to d Φ . And the expected Rademacher complexity R n (Φ) can be bounded by the Dudley entropy integral [32] :
where N (Φ, d Φ , ·) represents the covering numbers of (Φ, d Φ ). By the definition of d Φ , it follows that
and therefore
The second integral term could be easily obtained as follows
Consequently,
B Proof of Proposition 2
Proof of Proposition 2. First note that the left side L Q (h) ≤ L ǫ B ,1 (P, f ) is obvious by the definition. For the second part, we need to use the following Kantorovich dual representation of W 1 (·, ·) [35] :
For any Q, Q ′ ∈ B W ǫ B ,1 (P ), by the triangle inequality, we have W 1 (Q, Q ′ ) ≤ 2ǫ B . Since f is L-lipschitz, by Kantorovich dual representation, we get the following in-
Then by simply rearranging the terms, the above inequality could be expressed as
This inequality holds for any Q. Taking the supremum over Q ∈ B W ǫ B ,1 (P ) gives us
C Proofs of Corollary 2 and Corollary 3
Proof of Corollary 2. We first verify the assumption conditions in Theorem 1. Assumption 1 is evidently satisfied since diam(Z) ≤ (2r + 1). For each f ∈ F, assumption 2 holds with M = 1 + Λr. To verify assumption 3, we can write
So f (z) is max{2Λr, Λ}-Lipschitz and assumption 3 holds.
To evaluate the Dudley entropy integral, we need to estimate the covering numbers N (F, || · || ∞ , u/2). First observe, for any f 1 , f 2 ∈ F, we have
for 0 < u < 2Λr, and N (F, || · || ∞ , u/2) = 1 for u ≥ 2Λr, which gives
Substituting this into expression (4), we get the desired result
. For any f ∈ F, assumption 2 holds with M = 1 + Λ. For assumption 3, we have
Now we calculate the covering numbers N (F, || · || ∞ , u/2). Observe that 
Therefore, applying Corollary 1, we get
D Proof of Corollary 4
The goal of this section is to prove the adversarial expected risk for neural networks. To this end, it is necessary to first establish some properties of the margin operator M(v, y) = v y − max j =y v j and the ramp loss l γ .
Lemma D.1. For every j, M(·, j) is 2-Lipschitz with respect to || · || 2 .
Proof. Let u, v and y be given. If M(u, y) ≥ M(v, y), denote the index j which satisfies that M(v, y) = v y − v j . Then,
Otherwise, let j be the index satisfying M(u, y) = u y − u j , and we obtain
Therefore, M(·, j) is 2-Lipschitz with respect to || · || 2 .
Proof. By the definition of f , for any z and z ′ , we have
where the third inequality uses Lemma D.1 and the fourth inequality uses
Lemma D.3. For any two feedforward neural network H A and H A ′ where A = (A 1 , A 2 , · · · , A L ) and A ′ = (A ′ 1 , A ′ 2 , · · · , A ′ L ), we have the following
Proof. We proof this by induction.
For any i ≥ 1, we have the following
Therefore, using the induction step, we get the following
We now return to the proof of Corollary 4. Proof of Corollary 4. First we verify the three assumptions. Assumption 1 holds with diam(Z) ≤ 2r + 1. Assumption 2 is self-satisfied by the definition of ramp loss with 0 ≤ f (z) ≤ 1. By Lemma D.2, f is L-Lipschitz. Now we proceed to upper bound the covering number for F. For any f and f ′ , ||f − f ′ || ∞ = sup z |f (z) − f ′ (z)| = sup z |l γ (−M(H A (x), y)) − l γ (−M(H A ′ (x), y))|
where the last inequality applies lemma D.3. Since for any matrix A, we have ||A|| σ ≤ ||A|| F . The above inequality can be written as
Define u j , a j andā as Then, the covering number N (F, || · || ∞ , u/2) can be bounded by ∞ 0 log N (F, || · || ∞ , u/2)du
Since A i ∈ R d i ×d i−1 , we can regard A i as a vector in R m with m = d i · d i−1 and || · || F as the standard Euclidean distance in R m . Then the set {A i : ||A i || F ≤ b i } forms a b i -ball in R m , and the covering number for this ball could be upper bounded by
where the last inequality uses
Substituting it into Corollary 1, we obtain
